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Active networks accelerate network evolution by permitting 
the network infrastructure to be programmable, on a per- 
user, per-packet, or other basis. This programmability must 
be balanced against the safety and security needs inherent 
in shared resources. 
This paper describes the design, implementation, and 
performance of a new type of network element, an Active 
Bridge. The active bridge can be reprogrammed "on the 
fly", with loadable modules called switchlets. To demon- 
strate the use of the active property, we incrementally ex- 
tend what is initially a programmable buffered repeater with 
switchlets into a self-learning bridge, and then a bridge sup- 
porting spanning tree algorithms. To demonstrate the agility 
that active networking gives, we show how it is possible to 
upgrade a network from an "old" protocol to a "new" pro- 
tocol on-the-fly. Moreover, we are able to take advantage of 
information unavailable to the implementors of either pro- 
tocol to validate the new protocol and fall back to the old 
protocol if an error is detected. This shows that the Active 
Bridge can protect itself from some algorithmic failures in 
loadable modules. 
Our approach to safety and security favors static check- 
ing and prevention over dynamic checks when possible. We 
rely on strong type checking in the Caml language for the 
loadable module infrastructure, and achieve respectable per- 
formance. The prototype implementation on a Pentium- 
based HP Netserver LS running Linux with 100 Mbps Eth- 
ernet LANS achieves t t c p  throughput of 16 Mbps between 
two PCs running Linux, compared with 76 Mbps unbridged. 
Measured frame rates are in the neighborhood of 1800 frames 
per second. 
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1 Introduction 
"Active Networks" [~SS+971 are oacket-switched networks 
in which the network infrastructure is programmable and ex- 
tensible, and where network behavior can be controlled on a 
per-packet, per-user, or other basis. For example, a packet 
might carry executable code[TSS+97] that extends the net- 
work infrastructure. The goal in developing such networks 
is to greatly increase the flexibility and customizability of 
the network, and to thus accelerate the pace at  which net- 
work software is de~loved and evolves. Active Networks oro- . " 
vide an infrastructure for implementing earlier approaches 
to evolving networks such as "Protocol Boosters" [FMS98]. 
Switchware [SFG+96] is an experimental active network- 
ing project with the goal of using active networks to facil- 
itate rapid network evolution. This effort must begin with 
an architecture for the nodes that comprise the active net- 
work. To this end, we are building network components 
("switches") that can be programmed remotely over the net- 
work. A key question in this effort and indeed generally 
in active networks is how to allow the network to be pro- 
grammed remotely without compromising the safety and se- 
curity requirements that are crucial to the shared network 
infrastructure. A significant aspect of our approach is the 
use of high-level type-safe programming languages as a ba- 
sis for extensibility. These languages allow some basic and 
important low-level safety guarantees to be made by the pro- 
gramming language, thus providing a solid basis on which 
to build a safe, secure, and extensible software base. 
In this paper, we present the results of our initial imple- 
mentation experiment, an active network bridge. The bridge 
is programmed in Caml, a statically and strongly typed lan- 
guage. Caml is also used to extend the basic bridge function- 
ality. To demonstrate the usefulness of active networks, we 
show that we are able to down-load a crucial new algorithm 
into a running bridge and to dynamically switch the bridge 
from one operating regime to another. Normally, such a 
conversion would require bringing down the network and 
disrupting users. The ability to avoid such disruption rep- 
resents a significant advantage for active networking. Fur- 
thermore, the prototype achieves acceptable performance. 
The next section, Section 2, motivates research into Ac- 
tive Networks. Section 3 points out the major safety and se- 
curity risks of a programmable network infrastructure, and 
introduces our solution. Section 4 provides background on 
bridges for Section 5 ,  which describes our Active Bridge, 
with its incrementally loaded functionality. Section 6 con- 
tains a performance analysis, Section 7 relates our work to 
that of others, and Section 8 summarizes the new results. 
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Figure 1: Hourglass model  of internetworking. 
2 Why Active Networks? 
Network hardware and applications are evolving rapidly. 
Unfortunately, key parts of the network infrastructure evolve 
much more slowly, often taking more than half a decade to 
make their way from presentation at  SIGCOMM to deploy- 
ment by Internet Service Providers. For example, consider 
the five or more year time-line from RSVP conceptualiza- 
tion [CSZ92] to deployment [Pap96]. 
The existing network software infrastructure evolves 
slowly because of an important and fundamental design goal, 
the need for interoperability. Interoperability is achieved in 
the current Internet by using the hourglass model of net- 
working shown in Figure 1. Essentially the idea is that 
a wide variety of high-level services and low-level network 
technologies can be made to interoperate if all of their func- 
tionality funnels through a common interface, the waist of 
the hourglass. In the Internet, this waist is the I P  proto- 
col, which defines a standard packet format, and a virtual 
source/destination addressing mechanism that allow a wide 
variety of systems to interoperate. The success of this idea 
is clear from its current penetration and acceptance in the 
marketplace, and its enabling of other schemes such as the 
world-wide web. 
I t  is the need to standardize on the interoperability layer 
that makes network evolution slow. This is because when 
new functionality is needed that cannot be added either un- 
der or on top of the interoperability layer, then the inter- 
operability layer itself must be changed. The implication is 
that some basic changes in the network must be made at  
the speed with which standardization proceeds, rather than 
tracking the much more rapid pace of the basic technology. 
A good illustration of this is the speed (or lack thereof) of 
adding various types of support for QoS to the Internet. 
Active networks address this problem by making a funda- 
mental change in the nature of the interoperability layer. An 
interoperability layer is still crucial; without it there would 
be no common ground upon which to communicate. How- 
ever in an active network, instead of standardizing on the 
low-level packet formats and exchange protocols, the stan- 
dard is a programmable interface that allows the low level 
details to be programmed and customized as needed. As 
long as two communicating entities can run compatible code 
they can interoperate. This change allows the network to 
evolve as rapidly as new software can be developed because 
now new protocols can be deployed without any mediation 
of standards bodies. 
There are further advantages to active networks. For 
example, diagnostic functions can be inserted "as-needed," 
and proprietary protocols can coexist with public standards. 
Making the network itself programmable offers great power 
and flexibility, but it also creates significant new safety and 
security risks. The challenge is this: How can we provide 
this flexibility while preserving enough security for the net- 
work to be used by all? A further question is whether the 
needed safety and security can be achieved with acceptable 
performance? 
Switchware is exploring this challenge by focusing on 
- - 
the design and implementation of programmable network 
elements. With this a ~ ~ r o a c h ,  network elements that were 
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previously "store and forward"'become "store, compute, and 
forward" elements. Programming can be accomplished out- 
of-band, through an administrative interface, or in-band, 
through packets that are LLcapsules," as proposed by Wether- 
all et al. [TSS'~~] .  Each packet can contain both data 
and code that operates on the data. We call such pack- 
ets "switchlets" . This model allows advanced applications 
such as DNS proxies, self-directed multicast, etc. to be pro- 
grammed by users or network implementors remotely. 
Switchlets must provide for safe and secure extensibil- 
ity. Extensibility is intimately connected to the program- 
ming language that is used for the extensions. Thus, it 
seems natural to explore programming language-centric ap- 
proaches to providing the basis of secure extensions, and we 
are doing so. Modern programming languages such as Java, 
Modula-3, and ML provide significant advantages in safety 
and hence security. These advantages derive from the use 
of strong typing, supplemented by automatic storage man- 
agement (garbage collection), and array bounds checking. 
We discuss why strong typing provides safety advantages in 
some detail in Section 5.1.2. 
Because ML [MTHSO] is strongly typed, is well stud- 
ied by programming language semanticists, and because we 
have some considerable local ML expertise, we have chosen 
to use Caml [Ler95], an ML dialect, for our work. Caml also 
has two additional advantages for our work: byte codes and 
dynamic linking. The byte code format provided by Caml 
provides us with a machine independent format that is com- 
pact for transmitting switchlets over the network. Dynamic 
linking provides the ability to add these switchlets to an 
executing program. Several recent networking efforts have 
also used dialects of ML. For example, Biagioni [Bia94] de- 
scribes a TCP implementation based on Standard ML of 
New Jersey [AM871 and van Renesse [vR96] discusses a net- 
work stack implementation also based on Caml. 
4 Network Bridges 
Network designers must trade off complexities of address- 
ing and routing. Bridges1 are data link layer network el- 
ements that interconnect LANs to make extended LANs 
(ELANs) [Per92]. Bridging is a less flexible interconnec- 
tion solution than IP  internetwork routing, but it offers 
cost/performance advantages in many settings and is widely 
used. 
When bridges interconnect broadcast LANs such as Eth- 
ernet, they must provide the illusion that the ELAN is a 
broadcast network. For LANs L1 and L2, a "dumb" bridge 
would broadcast all frames seen on L1 to L2 and vice-versa. 
A self-learning bridge [HKS84] optimizes this behavior by 
tracking packet source addresses; if the destination of a 
frame lies on L1 then frames destined for that host need 
-
' ~ h r o u ~ h o u t  this paper, all bridges are transparent bridges, which 
are invisible to hosts, unlike the less common source routing bridges. 
not be forwarded to other LANs L2 ... Lk connected to the 
bridge. 
An important limitation of bridges is that since they can- 
not modify the packet (and therefore cannot use mechanisms 
like a time to live field), it is possible that they will direct 
packets in a loop, causing the packet to fail to make progress 
and wasting network resources. Worse yet, since a bridge 
that receives one packet may generate several packets, a 
loop can cause unbounded growth in the number of packets 
on the network leading to network collapse. 
There are a variety of approaches to guaranteeing loop 
free bridging. A very simple technique is to  physically con- 
struct the network so that  loops cannot form and perhaps to 
provide detection to indicate when a loop has been created. 
The solution adopted by the bridge industry is essentially 
this one, but at the logical rather than physical level. The 
idea is simply to constrain the bridges so that they never 
forward packets in a loop. This is done by imposing a span- 
ning tree on the graph representing links between bridges. 
A spanning tree has only one path between any two nodes, 
and thus as long as a bridge only forwards packets over ports 
that are part of a spanning tree, no loops are possible. Ports 
that are not in the tree do not have packets forwarded on 
them. 
Bridges have two phases of operation, a configuration 
phase in which a distributed algorithm is run to establish 
the spanning tree, and an operational phase in which the 
bridges actively forward packets. For the first several sec- 
onds that the bridge is running, it is in the configuration 
phase. During this time, the local portion of the spanning 
tree is calculated and the bridge starts to learn the location 
of hosts by inspecting the source addresses of the packets 
that are received. During the forwarding phase, the bridge 
begins to forward packets using the learned locations when 
applicable and only if that path is part of the spanning tree. 
The learning and spanning tree algorithms continue to run, 
in case new hosts or bridges are added to the network. 
5 The Active Bridge 
Because they are simple, but not trivial network elements, 
we have chosen to implement a bridge for our initial ac- 
tive network experiment. In particular, ignoring whatever 
administrative features are added by the manufacturer, a 
bridge has a simple security model: it forwards frames. 
Enhancements such as self-learning do not fundamentally 
change this basic function, and typically the queue service 
discipline for input and output frame queues is FIFO. Since 
bridge functionality is simple it is easily tested, and this 
simplicity is an asset during data analysis. Moreover, the 
ease of dividing a bridge into the three component functions 
previously discussed [Per921 make it ideal for a layered ar- 
chitecture such as our implementation. 
5.1 The Switchlet Loader 
A central aspect of an active network is the ability to load ex- 
ecutable code into the network elements. Thus, it is no sur- 
prise that a basic component of our system is our switchlet 
loader, which allows the user to load in new switchlets and 
to execute them. Another important aspect of the loader is 
that it establishes the environment in which switchlets ex- 
ecute. Controlling the execution environment allows us to 
exclude operations like opening disk files that are unneces- 
sary for a switchlet and which may pose security risks. 
To produce the restricted environment we use a feature of 
Caml called module thinning [Rou96]. In Caml, groups of re- 
lated functions, along with their supporting data structures 
and types, can be aggregated into a module. Each mod- 
ule has a signature that describes which values, types, and 
functions are known to external functions. We have thinned 
the signature of the modules to be accessed by switchlets to 
exclude those functions that might allow security violations. 
This leaves the switchlet with no way of naming the excluded 
function and thus, no way of accessing it. We discuss this 
point in detail in the next section. 
Caml supports this process by including signatures in the 
byte code that is used to transmit switchlets. When Caml 
compiles a set of sources into byte codes, it includes an MD5 
digest of the interfaces required by this module as well as 
the MD5 digest of the interface exported by this module. 
If the byte codes are unaltered module thinning works as 
described. For simplicity, in our current experiment, we 
have not addressed the authentication issues, but these are 
an important avenue for further work. 
5.1.1 Module Isolation 
A key transition made by our security model is from us- 
ing address spaces to name spaces as the basis of security. 
Aspects of such a model have been examined in the con- 
text of the Nemesys operating system for multimedia appli- 
cations [LMB' 961, and in some sense by capability-based 
systems. 
If switchlets were written in a weakly typed language like 
C, a switchlet would be able to access any part of its address 
space. Unchecked this ability would allow a switchlet to call 
any function in the address space, or worse to over-write 
the code or data of another switchlet. Enforcing security 
in a shared address space would be impossible. Tradition- 
ally, if multiple programs written in weakly typed languages 
are to share resources, security mechanisms such as sepa- 
rate address spaces are used to ensure that a program can 
only affect its own physical memory. Page protections en- 
sure that a program only directly reads, writes, or executes 
unshared resources. When sharing is needed, it is mediated 
by the operating system, and when different processes need 
to execute, they require a context switch. These mecha- 
nisms operate while the program is executing and thus have 
a runtime cost. 
Our prototype presumes a single-language environment 
and uses strong typing to guarantee that only certain op- 
erations are allowed. Furthermore, by using static typing, 
which enforces type safety during compilation and linking, 
we are able to substitute com~ile-time and link-time costs 
for runtime costs. For example, functions are immutable 
objects, so there is no operator that allows one to change a 
function. (One could change a functzon reference to refer to 
another function, but there is no way to modify the function 
itself.) Further, there is no equivalent of a C cast operator2, 
so there is no way to "trick" Caml into thinking a function 
is an object that can be changed. Thus, there is no need for 
page protection since Caml provides equivalent protection 
on an object by object basis at  compile and link times when 
it ensures that the types are all correct. 
For type safety to be fully enforced statically, it is also 
necessary for the system to use automatic dynamic stor- 
age allocation (garbage collection) and to check that array 
 here are transformation operators for making some safe, well un- 
derstood transformations. For example, there is a function to  trans- 
form an integer to a floating point number. 
val pub-hash: 
(string, (int -> int)) Safestd.Hashtb1.t 
val pub-func: unit -> unit 
Figure 2: example.mli  
open Safestd 
let pub-hash = Hashtbl.create 15 
let priv-func x = x - 7 
let some-func x = (priv-func x) + 5 
let pub-func 0 = 
Hashtbl .add pub-hash "f unc" some-func 
Figure 3: example.ml 
bounds are not overrun. Both of these features improve the 
safety and thus security of the system in general. For exam- 
ple, many common Unix security holes are created because 
C does not check array bounds. This allows a malicious pro- 
grammer to overwrite the stack and upon returning from a 
call to execute arbitrary code. Similar tricks can be played if 
the programmer is allowed to free memory that is in use by 
other parts of the program. Using garbage collection (GC) 
avoids these problems, since only the system frees storage. 
The lack of a cast operator or an address operator also 
makes it impossible to refer to any object without either its 
name or a string of legal pointer references from a known 
object. Name-space based security rests on this feature. 
Figure 2 (the module interface) and Figure 3 (the module 
itself) contain some contrived code to illustrate this point. 
If another module wishes to reference objects from the mod- 
ule example, initially, it can only refer to those objects in 
its interface (signature). Attempts to access other objects 
result in compile time errors. If the other module were com- 
piled against a signature built by an attacker that included 
some private objects, a link time error would result because 
the signatures would not match. 
The values accessible from the interface are the func- 
tion example .pub-f unc and the hash table called example. 
pubhash; they can be referred to directly by name. Initially, 
example. pub-hash is empty and does not lead to any func- 
tions. When example .pub-func is evaluated, then the func- 
tion example. some-func becomes accessible because there 
is a reference path to it through pubhash, and evaluat- 
ing Hashtbl .find example. pubhash "func" would return 
example. some-func. 
5.1.2 Switchlet Linking Model 
For the bridge, we used the rather simple linking model of- 
fered by Caml. A Dynlink module is provided that sup- 
ports dynamically linking byte codes containing a module 
into a running program. To use these facilities, one must 
first call Dynlink. init which creates an empty name space 
into which modules can be loaded. Next, to create an ini- 
tial environment, one calls Dynlink . add-available-units 
which enters the names from specified modules that were 
linked into the loader when it was built into the name space. 
For the loader, the nlodules specified in this way provide 
functions ranging from integer addition to some network- 
ing functions. (See the next section for more details.) Fi- 
nally, by calling Dynlink . load, one can load byte-codes and 
add them to the name space. There is no function to allow 
previously linked functions (whether linked dynamically or 
statically) to access the newly loaded functions, so the byte 
codes usually contain some top-level forms that call a reg- 
istration function, that changes a data structure visible to 
previously linked functions. 
For the prototype bridge, a single name space is suffi- 
cient, and it ensures that many types of accidental refer- 
ences do not occur. However, it does not protect against 
malicious references. When we start to build devices that 
we intend to be used by multiple users, we will need a way of 
managing multiple namespaces that incorporates a variety 
of security issues. Providing such facilities is another area 
for research that is important for active networks. 
5.2 The Switchlet Loading Process 
When the loader first starts, it is limited to those capabilities 
required to continue the loading process or which must be 
staticly linked for security reasons. By dynamically loading 
everything else, we can retain the maximum flexibility. In 
particular, the initial loader can only load switchlets from 
disk. 
To overcome this limitation, we load a network loader. It 
consists of four layers. The lowest layer captures those Eth- 
ernet layer frames destined for an Ethernet card installed 
on this machines. I t  then demultiplexes these frames based 
on the Ethernet protocol identifier. The next layer imple- 
ments a minimal IP  [Pos81] sufficient for our purposes. (It 
does not, for example, implement fragmentation.) The I P  
protocol identifier field is used to demultiplex these packets 
to other switchlets. The next layer implements a minimal 
UDP [Pos80] in a similar fashion. Finally, the highest layer 
in this stack implements a TFTP [So1921 server. This server 
only services write requests in binary format. Any such file 
is taken to be a Caml byte code file and, upon successful re- 
ceipt, an attempt is made to dynamically load and evaluate 
the file. 
This approach does not describe how we build a network 
capable of loading all of the switches. There must be a 
mechanism by which a host can load a protocol into a switch 
to which it does not have a direct connection. For our bridge, 
we can easily build up an infrastructure in steps by sending 
the bridge switchlet to all adjacent switches and then waiting 
for these switches to start bridging. At the diameter of the 
extended LAN grows by one at  each subsequent step, we can 
load those switches whose shortest path is one link greater 
than was possible in the previous step. 
If one desires a more concurrent protocol installation, 
there are several possible choices best chosen based on the 
protocol and local knowledge. For example, if the switches 
are currently not forwarding any traffic for lack of any pro- 
tocol to do so, using a flood algorithm to send the protocol 
switchlet to all the switches in the network might work well. 
If there are forwarding protocols on the network, it may be 
possible to leverage off of these to route our switchlets to 
the desired locations. 
5.2.1 The Interface Provided to Switchlets 
Currently, the loader provides an initial set of eight mod- 
ules. These modules define the basic environment in which 
a switchlet will execute. We expect this set to continue to 
evolve as we gain more experience programming switchlets. 
The most basic of the modules provided is Safestd. This 
is a slightly modified version of the Safestd module from the 
type packet = { len : int; 
addr : Safeunix.sockaddr; 





(* Input ports *) 
val pkts-waiting-p-in: iport -> bool 
val bind-in: string -> iport 
val bind-addr: string -> iport 
val get-next-pkt-in: iport -> packet 
val unbind-in: iport -> unit 
val unbind-addr: iport -> unit 
val get-iport: unit -> iport 
(* Output ports *) 
val bind-out: string -> oport 
val send-pkt-out: 
oport -> string -> int -> int -> 
Safeunix.sockaddr -> int 
val unbind-out: oport -> unit 
val get-oport: unit -> oport 
val ready-to-send-p-out: oport -> bool 
(* Generic functions *) 
val iport-to-oport: iport -> oport 
(* Debugging aids *) 
val debug-iport-to-string: iport -> string 
val debug-oport-to-string: oport -> string 
val debug-demux-num-devs: unit -> int 
Figure 4: unixnet .mli 
MMM browser [Rou96]. I t  provides a set of standard Caml 
functions ranging from integer operations to an implementa- 
tion of hash tables. As the name implies, it has been thinned 
to only allow "safe" operations. Similarly, Saf eunix is a very 
heavily thinned version of the Unix module from Caml. Our 
version of Safeunix provides access to some time related 
functions and to some types that are needed for networking. 
Since we provide no functions for generating output as part 
of Saf eunix, we provide a module called Log that allows log- 
ging messages to be generated. I t  also allows us to change 
the method of logging, to a terminal, to disk, or not at all. 
We also provide a set of thread related modules. These 
are built on top of the basic Caml threads package that 
works entirely in user mode. Thus, no speedup occurs due 
to our multiprocessor. We hope to be able to take advantage 
of the POSIX threads in the near future. The threads mod- 
ules are Safethread, Condition, and Mutex. Safethread is 
only very lightly modified from Thread; because there are no 
ways to create an object of type Thread. t except by call- 
ing Thread.create, we can even leave Thread.kil1 in the 
module. 
So far, we have had to create two new modules to provide 
support. The first of these, Func, contains glue routines to 
allow the loaded functions to properly register themselves. 
The register routine simply takes a string as a key and a 
function and enters them into a hash table. There is also a 
function that allows one to evaluate one of these functions. 
Finally, we provided a module to allow access to the net- 
work. Unixnet provides a set of functions that allow access 
to the network interfaces on the machine as shown in Fig- 
ure 4. Our model separates those functions used for input 
from those from output. In each case, a function is provided 
to connect to a given port, to connect to the next available 
port, to disconnect from a port, to check the status of the 
port, and to send or receive a packet on the port. Because 
we are building a bridge, whenever an input port is bound, 
it is put into promiscuous mode. Currently, we use a simple 
model in which the first switchlet to bind to a given port suc- 
ceeds and. all others fail. We plan to explore the appropriate 
way to arbitrate between conflicting claims as we continue 
our work. 
5.3 The Bridge Switchlets 
The three switchlets that make up the bridge are built on 
top of the interfaces just described. They are loaded in turn 
to build up the fully functional bridge. 
The first, lowest level switchlet implements a minimal 
"dumb" bridge. I t  has three parts. Part one is a function 
that reads an input packet from a queue and sends it out 
through a given network interface. Part two is a function 
that takes an input packet and queues it to all network in- 
terfaces except for the one on which it was received. Part 
three is a function that reads packets from a network in- 
terface and demultiplexes them to the functions from part 
two. 
This switchlet is actually performing the function of a 
buffered repeater. It cannot tolerate a network topology 
with any loops and will not support a network with ag- 
gregate traffic higher than the traffic limit for its slowest 
segment. 
The second switchlet adds learning to the bridge. This 
switchlet replaces the switching function from the dumb 
bridge with one that learns the locations of the hosts on the 
network. For each packet received, the triple (source ad- 
dress, current time, input port) is placed into a hash table 
keyed by the source address, replacing any previous entry3. 
Next, the hash table is searched for the destination address 
of the packet. If a match is found and is current, the packet 
is sent out on the port indicated unless that was the port 
on which the packet was received. If no match is found, this 
bridge has not yet learned the destination address and the 
packet is sent out on all ports except the one on which it 
arrived. 
The third and final switchlet implements the spanning 
tree functionality. This switchlet adds a function that regis- 
ters with the demultiplexer requesting packets addressed to 
the All Bridges multicast address. All other packets continue 
to be sent to the learning function from the second switchlet. 
Based on the 802.1D protocol [IEE93], this function takes 
part in the calculation of the spanning tree for the network. 
Then it uses access points in the previous switchlets to sup- 
press the traffic from certain input and output ports. With 
this switchlet, we have a fully functional bridge. 
5.4 Automatic Protocol Transition 
So far, we have demonstrated that active networks allow one 
to modularly build up a network element and to extend it 
3Actually, if the source address is a multicast or broadcast ad- 
dress, this step is bypassed. Similarly, if the destination address is 
a broadcast or multicast address, the packet is sent out on all ports 
except the one on which it arrived. 
remotely, enhancing its functionality. This is an important 
step towards our goal of improving network extensibility, but 
it does not illustrate how active networks allow us to replace 
basic functionality. To demonstrate this facility, we built a 
facility that allows our bridge to transition between different, 
incompatible protocols in a coordinated, automatic manner 
with automatic fall back if the new protocol should fail. 
An important difficulty encountered in managing a net- 
work is making changes to the infrastructure. Generally, 
this requires bringing down the node to be upgraded. If the 
change is incompatible, the problem becomes much worse. 
In the case that none of the nodes is capable of acting as a 
gateway between the two versions of the protocol, the net- 
work must either be partitioned into a portion supporting 
the old protocol and another supporting the new protocol 
or the entire network must be brought down, upgraded, and 
returned to service as a unit. Generally, neither of these 
choices is very acceptable to the users of the network. More- 
over, if it turns out that the new protocol does not work for 
some reason, the same process must be used in reverse to 
back out the changes. 
In this experiment, we show how an active bridge can 
perform such a transition in an automated, coordinated fash- 
ion. The network partition still occurs, but at  the pace the 
infrastructure sends and processes packets rather than at the 
pace of the network administrators can move from machine 
to machine. Thus, the transition can be expected to take 
time similar to what would occur if there were a power fail- 
ure at  each of the bridges. Moreover, active monitoring can 
occur while the network is stabilizing, detecting any failures 
in the new implementation and transitioning the infrastruc- 
ture to a stable state such as the previous protocol. 
In order to have a pair of protocols to transition between, 
we modified the spanning tree switchlet t o  send DEC span- 
ning tree packets to the DEC management multicast ad- 
dress instead of 802.1D packets to the All Bridges multicast 
address4. This DEC-like protocol was used as the old pro- 
tocol. The 802.1D protocol was used as the new protocol. 
We also wrote a control switchlet that was capable of 
controlling the transition between the two protocols. This 
is the component which capitalizes on the ability to actively 
load switchlets by using locally available information. (If 
one were to deploy a facility like this generally, we would 
expect that the old and new protocols would be written by 
a single programmer and distributed and that the control 
switchlet would either be written or customized by each of 
the local network administrators based on their knowledge of 
their networks.) In order to load the control switchlet, both 
the 802.1D switchlet and the DEC switchlet must already be 
loaded. It checks that the DEC switchlet is operating and 
that the 802.1D switchlet is not. I t  then arranges to receive 
any packets addressed to the All Bridges multicast address. 
When an 802.1D packet arrives, the control switchlet as- 
sumes that the network is transitioning to the new protocol. 
It halts the DEC protocol and starts the 802.1D protocol. 
It also arranges to let the 802.1D protocol listen to the All 
Bridges address and it starts to listen to the DEC address. 
Any DEC protocol packets received during an initial tran- 
sition period are suppressed. The 802.1D switchlet sends 
out configuration packets on all of its ports thus causing 
any bridge that is on a connected network and that has not 
transitioned to do so. 
I action I DEC I IEEE I control 1 
I I running I 
- ,  I loadlstart 1 running I loaded I running 
control 
recv IEEE I suspended I loaded I suspend DEC; I packet I I I capture DEC ' I 
I I I I state I 
I loaded ( running I start IEEE 
30 seconds I loaded I running/ I suppress DEC I forwarding I packets 
60 seconds ( loaded I running I perform tests 
pass tests 
Table 1: Automatic Protocol Transition 
fail tests 
or fallback 
The control switchlet next moves into its monitoring 
loaded 
" 
phase. For this particular transition, the critical change is 
the protocol for computing the spanning tree. Based on lo- 
cal knowledge, we have determined that the portion of the 
spanning tree computed at each node should be identical 
for the old and the new protocols. As such, the control 
switchlet monitors the information about the spanning tree 
accumulated at the current node. This is compared with in- 
formation captured from the DEC algorithm at  the time of 
its termination. (If the changes were such that the informa- 
tion to be checked were not available a t  the node, it could be 
hand calculated for the expected case.) If the spanning tree 
does not converge to the expected values within a predeter- 
mined time, the control switchlet will determine that  there 
must be a bug in the new protocol implementation. Simi- 
larly, the old host location table could be compared with the 
new host location tables if the network administrators were 
not planning to move any hardware during the transition pe- 
riod. If a failure is detected, the functions implementing the 






The control switchlet again changes so that it receives new 
protocol packets (which it suppresses) and allows the old 
protocol to process its own packets. As a final measure to 
allow fall back to occur gracefully, if the control switchlet 
finds any old protocol packets after the initial transition pe- 
riod, it falls back to the old protocol assuming that a failure 
has occurred elsewhere in the network. Once this fallback 
has occurred, the network is considered "stable" and no fur- 
ther transition will occur without human intervention. 
per network 
admin 
fallback if DEC 
vacket arrives 
loaded 
6 Implementation Details 
The active node functions are carried out by programs ex- 
ecuting in the Caml bytecode interpreter. The interpreter 
opens Ethernet sockets (a special type allowed by Linux), to 
create paths from an input device to the Caml interpreter, 
and from the Caml interpreter to a corresponding output 
device. 
4 ~ o  c mpletely implement the DEC protocol would require chang- 
ing some timings and states as well. We did not do this. We sim- 
ply required an incompatible packet format so that we could make a 
transition. 
Linux 
Figure 6: Active bridge machine architecture 
Figure 5: Path for a packet in a Switchware active 
node 
The path for an Ethernet frame can be decomposed as seven 
steps, as shown in Figure 5. 
1. Frame arrives on Ethernet adapter 
2. Ethernet Interrupt Service Routine (ISR) woken; it 
collects a frame into a buffer chain of Linux network 
buffers 
3. Linux wakes the bridge thread and delivers the frame 
through recvf r o m 0  
Pasquale [KP93] has called data-touching costs and non- 
data-touching costs. Bridge throughput will vary across 
packet size mixes, for example, very small packets will incur 
almost all of their overhead as non-data-touching costs. 
Second are performance measures specific to the type of 
networking device under study, for example scalability in 
the number of ports handled is an important measure of a 
switching architecture. For a bridge, the capacity to support 
many LANs and their associated endpoints can be stated as 
an aggregate throughput, a number of line cards, etc; the 
important point is to get a sense of where adding another 
bridge makes more sense than attempting to augment an 
existing bridge with additional busy hosts, or LAN-attached 
line cards. 
Finally, peculiar to "on-the-fly" programmable network 
infrastructures is the rate at  which changes in the infrastruc- 
ture can be made and become effective. This is a limiting 
factor for the function-agility of the new network infrastruc- 
ture. 
4. The Caml program operates on the frame 
5. The Caml program emits the packet to Linux network 
buffers via sendto 0 
6. Linux queues the frame to the Ethernet driver 
7. The Ethernet driver emits the frame to the destination 
LAN 
As currently implemented, the packets are all Ethernet 
frames. The CRC is returned on a read, but cannot be 
specified on a write. (This is one of our 802.1D incompati- 
bilities.) The packets are represented as a record containing 
the length of the packet, a Unix sockaddr in a Caml form, 
and a string with the data. The user must unmarshall the 
data from the string. In the future, we plan to look at  the 
relative advantages of providing unmarshalling functions in- 
stead. 
7 Performance, Scalability and Flexibility 
We study performance under three types of measures. 
First are the traditional performance measures such as 
throughput, latency and packets per second. Latency in 
a bridge is additional delay incurred by passage through 
the logic and buffering of the bridge compared to an un- 
bridged system. Bridge throughput will be affected by both 
per-packet costs and the per-byte costs [CJRS89], or what 
7.1 Experimental Setup 
The hardware platform for the active bridge is a Hewlett- 
Packard Netserver 51166 LS4 Model 1, a 4 processor shared- 
memory multiprocessor. The processors are 166 Mhz Intel 
Pentiums and each processor has a first level cache that  is 
8KB of data and 4KB of instruction, write through and a 
1 MB second level cache. The machine has 128MB ECC 
memory, 2 PC1 slots, 4 EISA slots, 2 PCI/EISA slots, 2 
Fast/Wide SCSI-2 controllers, and 1024K video memory/ 
SVGA controller. Multiple 100 Mbps Ethernet adapters are 
used as bridge port controllers. The configuration is shown 
in Figure 6. 
The software architecture is shown in Figure 5. The 
Linux is Red Hat version 4.0 with a version 2.0.23 kernel. 
The active bridge implementation has been operating 
successfully in our laboratory (replacing a DEC LANbridge) 
for over 3 months. For performance measurements, we re- 
nioved it from the laboratory network and interconnected 
two 100 Mb/s LANs as shown in Figure 7. 
The hosts were Intel Pentiums running with a version 
2.0.28 Linux kernel. To obtain baseline performance mea- 
sures, we duplicated latency and throughput measurements 
on the "best case" configuration of two hosts interconnected 
by a single LAN, as shown in Figure 8. 
H o s t #  1-;I Active 1 Mbls 
Bridge L N#2 
Linux on Linux on 
Figure 7: Bridging Setup 
7.2 Latency 
We measured latency with the ping facility for generating 
ICMP ECHOs, using various packet sizes to  generate frames 
on the LANs. Results are given in Figure 9. With additional 
instrumentation, we were able to determine that the Cam1 
code execution adds 0.34ms per frame. We suspect that the 
additional per frame latency of the bridge is due to Linux 
and the need to transfer the frame into user space. 
7.3 Throughput 
Throughput for various packet sizes was measured with re- 
peated t t c p  trials. The baseline performance, measured on 
the bridgeless network, was 76 Mb/s. With an 8 KB IP 
packet size (resulting in multiple back-to-back LAN frames), 
the active bridge achieves a throughput of 16 Mb/s. The 
performance in frames/second was calculated for the same 
frame sizes shown and ranged from about 360 frames per 
second for small frames (ca. 50 bytes) to 1790 frames per 
second for 1024 byte frames. 
Additional instrumentation showed a cost per frame 
within Caml of 0.47ms on average during a ttcp trial. This 
translates to a limiting rate of 2100 frames per second or 
about 32 Mb/s before accounting for operating system and 
transmission overheads. We have not yet had an opportu- 
nity to isolate the source of the Caml overheads. Three pos- 
sibilities seem likely. First, some of the cost is certainly due 
to the cost of the bridge functionality, which is not reflected 
in our very simple C-based repeater. Second, our current 
Caml system uses a bytecode interpreter, which is certainly 
likely to have a severe performance penalty compared to na- 
tive code. Caml does have a native code compiler, although 
some work will be needed to adapt it so that it can deal 
with dynamically loaded switchlets. The final possibility 
is that we are seeing interference from the garbage collec- 
tor. The Caml collector is based on the concurrent collector 
described in [DL93], but the released implementation does 
not use multiple threads to run the collector. If measure- 
ments show that the collector is the bottle neck, then this is 
a likely source of improvement. Other concurrent collector 
technologies are available as well, many based on Baker's 
algorithm [Bak78], and others on techniques that are espe- 
cially well suited for ML [N093, ON941. 
We also built a very simple buffered repeater in C to 
try to determine the smallest overheads that a user mode 
Host #l Host #2 
Linux on Linux on 
Active bridge 
C Buffered Repeater -+---- 
direct connection --e-- 
0.0 
32 512 1024 2048 4096 
packet slze (bytes) 
Figure 9: Ping Latencies 
program could expect to see. This program simply opens 
two Ethernet devices in promiscuous mode and, for each 
packet received on one of the interfaces, writes the packet 
on the other. This gives some idea of the costs caused by 
bringing the data through the Linux kernel into user space. 
We intend to examine an approach like that used by the U- 
Net project [vEBBV95] in the future. They allow protected 
user mode access to network devices which has reduced the 
boundary crossing costs. 
7.4 Scalability 
Using a general-purpose multiprocessor as a switch is an es- 
tablished technique for experimental packet-switching net- 
works [EBE+86, KEM+78]. The major performance limita- 
tions associated with such a ~ la t fo rm are bus and memorv 
bandwidth limitations inherent in an architecture not spe- 
cialized for scaling or aggregation. As discussed by Edmond, 
et al., once the hardware architecture is set, the major per- 
formance limitations come from the software architecture. 
For our system, the major limit is the concurrency we can 
access in our implementation. First, while it would be ad- 
vantageous to have threads support for our Caml system to 
take advantage of the multiprocessor, this is not yet opera- 
tional. Second, since Caml is a garbage-collected language, 
there are occasional pauses which force the system to se- 
rialize the threads. This is another place where the GC 
techniques mentioned above may well become important. 
direct connection +- 
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Active bridge --m-- - 
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7.5 Agility 
The function-agility of a system is the latency for a func- 
tional transformation. In the context of active bridging, we 
can measure this as the time needed to load a module, and 
the time needed for it to take action. For the spanning tree 
alternatives we developed, a good measure of the agility is 
the ability of the active portion of the system (the loaded 
Caml code) to switch spanning tree protocols. 
We performed a final test using a ring shaped network. 
The HP Netserver acted as an end-node to take measure- 
ments. It was configured with two Ethernet cards, ethO 
and e t h l .  Attached between these cards were three of the 
166Mhz Pentiums each with two Ethernet cards. These 
three machines were each running the bridge software with 
the control switchlet to allow automatic switch-over. 
A test program running on the HP sent out an 802.1D 
spanning tree packet on ethO and then waits to see one on 
e t h l .  (This indicates that each of the bridges in the path be- 
tween ethO and e t h l  have switched to the "new" algorithm.) 
The program then starts two threads one of which sends out 
a prebuilt ICMP ECHO on eth0, then delays for 1 second, 
and repeats. The other thread reads packets on e t h l  until 
it sees one of these pings. ge t t imeofday0 is called before 
sending the IEEE frame after receiving the IEEE frame, and 
after both threads have died. 
For a set of trials, the average start to IEEE time mea- 
sured was 0.056 seconds, and the average start to received 
ping time was 30.1 seconds. Thus, the active bridge's recon- 
figuration was much faster (<0.1 second) than timeouts (ac- 
counting for the additional 30 seconds) built into the bridge 
protocols to ensure that temporary loops do not occur. 
8 Related Work 
Wetherall and Tennenhouse [WT96] have constructed an 
Active Network node architecture that uses a TCL inter- 
preter operating on the Linux operating system. The AC- 
T I V E - I P  option is used to flag I P  packets containing cap- 
sules, which are packets and data passed to the TCL inter- 
preter. The scheme has been applied to some IP tasks, such 
as implementing t r ace rou t e  with capsules. This work has 
been very focused on a proof-of-concept for an active node, 
and demonstrating viability of the idea. Our research is 
concentrated on the design and construction of the program- 
ming environment for a robust extensible node, and would 
be as useful for capsule support as it is for adding bridge 
functionality. Other work a t  MIT [WEK96] has demon- 
strated methods for loading network modules (Application- 
Specific Safe Handlers, or ASHs) into O.S. kernels. Like our 
work, ASHs rely on pre-module loading static analyses; we 
believe that the Caml approach offers a better long-term 
opportunity for formal verification. 
Zegura, e t  al. [BCZ96] have designed a similar IP-based 
system, which demultiplexes an arriving packet with the op- 
tion flag, I P O P T A P ,  to a pre-loaded function under SunOS. 
This approach has two flaws from our perspective. First, it 
appears inflexible with respect to applications loading new 
functions on-the-fly. Second, to address this flexibility lim- 
itation with modifications to SunOS, there will be security 
risks unless languages and tools are used to validate loaded 
modules, as in our approach. 
Liquid Software [HMPP96] extends the capabilities of 
the Java language bytecodes as mobile code fragments. Ma- 
jor foci are technologies for fast compilation of mobile code 
(to ensure high packet processing rates) and runtime sup- 
port using the Scout operating system as a basis. The inter- 
action between the Scout system and the Java API should 
provide some valuable lessons in the nature of a virtual ma- 
chine that could support Active Nets. The choice of Java is 
a potential weakness, as a number of serious security prob- 
lems have been discovered. Unlike ML [MTHSO], Java lacks 
a mathematical definition, making formal analysis of pro- 
grams difficult. 
BBN's Smart Packets [PJ96] is focused on the efficient 
construction of the packet interpreting programming system 
for active networks. Smart Packets, like the capsules pro- 
posed in the MIT design, contain code in some form. The 
initial effort seems targeted at  efficient byte code (e.g., a re- 
fined Java or intermediate language) or even machine code 
in the packet. The intent is to ensure that loadable active 
technologies will be viable on even the highest-performance 
networks. 
Netscript [Yd96] provides a model for network program- 
ming, but is less focused on the construction of active net- 
work nodes than the MIT, Georgia Tech, Arizona and BBN 
efforts, and more on defining examples of network program- 
ming. 
MMM [Rou96] is a browser that uses Caml as its applet 
language. They also use the strongly typed features of the 
language for security, but are able to assume a model in 
which all applets cooperate. Further, their applets extend a 
browser rather than extending the functionality of a network 
switch. Some of our infrastructure, in particular support for 
module thinning is derived from their efforts. 
9 Conclusions 
We have made significant progress towards a robust and 
flexible programmable network infrastructure. The active 
bridge described in this paper is written in a modern pro- 
gramming language, Caml, with strong static type-checking 
and memory safety through garbage collection. Several dif- 
ferent bridging styles were enabled using loadable modules 
("switchlets") that we injected into the active node on the 
fly. 
In the experiments we performed, the bridge was able to 
support about 44% of the throughput seen by a C program 
that provided repeater, but not bridge functionality. The 
measured throughput is 16 Mbps, with an intervening oper- 
ating system and interpreted Caml modules. Optimizations 
such as compiling switchlets into native code for faster oper- 
ation, shortening the Linux path between interrupt arrival 
and switchlet operation, improving GC performance, and 
increasing concurrency, all offer possibilities for improving 
this result. 
An important result to take away from this paper is the 
flexibility our Active Networking technology provides, even 
in the restricted domain of transparent bridging. We started 
with a simple repeater, and extended it with-switchlets to 
become self-learning, to run spanning tree protocols, and 
to adapt the choice of protocols using information encoded 
in the Ethernet frame. Advanced algorithms for scaling 
bridged LANs [SC88] using a multiplicity of spanning trees 
or LAN interworking functions [VP88] could be added as 
switchlets to the current system. 
Next, we plan to see what steps can be taken to minimize 
Linux overheads, increase concurrency, and to extend the 
ideas described here to an active router. The active router 
has the advantage, from a switchlet design perspective, that 
it need not be transparent. This opens up a much larger 
set of functions that can be used. Among these functions 
are various forms of application-specified Quality-of-Service, 
and since Caml is garbage-collected, we are investigating 
Caml run-time issues such as a real-time garbage-collector 
for the router. As an example of a problem facing current 
systems that could be solved with such technology, consider 
the problem of a bottleneck link in the Internet, where a pol- 
icy dictates a 25% link fraction for a particular user. The 
user could load a policy for working within this limit, lead- 
ing to both better performance for the user and possibly less 
effort on the part of the policing function. Another prob- 
lem that could be addressed, in a manner similar to our ac- 
tive protocol transition, is support for multiple versions and 
parallel network infrastructures in a single network element. 
Thus, IPv4, IPSEC, IPv6, and experimental IP modifica- 
tions such as support for mobility could be loaded, config- 
ured for fail-soft operation, and operating concurrently. 
In summary, network elements should be secure and ro- 
bust. The active bridge described here performs reasonably, 
is flexible and extensible, and illustrates an attractive path 
towards an active network infrastructure. 
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